mittee (DNC) and Republican National Committee (RNC). While the activity in one election cycle is not enough to gauge the eventual consequences of this reform, the 2004 experience highlights how the parties have responded to the new rules and offers indications of how they are likely to conduct their financial activities in the future. 3 
QUESTIONS
Would the parties be weakened under BCRA? This was a central question throughout the congressional deliberations, legal challenges, and regulatory proceedings associated with the law's passage. Those engaged in the debate generally agreed that parties have a vital and salutary effect on the political system, and most were advocates of strong party organizations. But they disagreed as to the parties' potential capacity to raise funds under BCRA's constraints and drew varying conclusions from recent patterns in party finance.
The major issue raised in the BCRA debate concerned the role of party committees in national elections. Would the parties continue to play an important role in campaign funding without soft money? Would they be able to replace a substantial portion of their former soft money receipts and, if so, over what period of time? The national party committees certainly faced a sizable task in replacing the combined $495 million of soft money receipts that they raised in each of the two previous election cycles. To compensate for this loss completely, the Democrats would need to more than double the $213 million of hard money they raised in 2000, while the Republicans would have to up their total of $362 million by almost 70 percent. By contrast, between the 1996 and 2000 presidential election cycles, the national parties had increased their combined hard money resources by only $77 million, with the Democratic committees, which began with a much smaller base, increasing their hard money funds by $47 million, or 28 percent, and the Republican committees increasing theirs by $30 million, or 9 percent. Some analysts argued that the national parties would not be able to compensate wholly for the loss of soft money and that they would be required to reduce their activities and organizational efforts in federal campaigns (La Raja 2002 , 2003c Milkis 2003) . Others contended that the parties would have an incentive to invest more effort into hard money fundraising, especially with regard to the solicitation of small donors, and, as a result, would strengthen their grassroots organizational support by involving larger numbers of party members in their fundraising activi- A second, and related, issue concerned the effect of BCRA on interparty competition. Since the adoption of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) in 1974, the Republican national party committees had been more successful in raising hard dollars than their Democratic counterparts. The Republicans benefited from continuing investments in direct mail fundraising over a long term, which had provided the party with a broad base of active small donors. Accordingly, many analysts expected that under BCRA's hard money regime the Repub-licans would hold a substantial financial advantage over the Democrats. In the two elections immediately preceding the adoption of the new law, the Republicans raised significantly more hard money than the Democrats, and the Democrats had become increasingly dependent on soft money to remain competitive. In the 2000 cycle, the Republicans raised $149 million more in hard money contributions than the Democrats; in 2002, $191 million more. In these same elections, the Democratic national party committees raised more than half of their total receipts from soft dollars. These patterns led some analysts to argue that the Democrats would be seriously disadvantaged under the new rules, with some observers going so far as to claim that it would prove to be a ''Democratic Party suicide bill'' (Gitell 2003) . Others maintained that the Democrats would rise to the occasion and raise the monies needed to wage meaningful campaigns. The Democrats, they contended, would at least have the resources needed to compete where party spending might matter most-in battleground presidential general election states and the relatively small number of competitive Senate and House contests. Thus, the question of whether the Democrats would be able to raise enough money to compete financially remained open, particularly given the expected financial disparity between the parties and the fact that party committees would have the option of spending unlimited amounts of hard money on independent expenditures in key contests.
Experts also differed in their assessments of the effects of BCRA on party campaigning and party integration. From 1996 to 2002, national party committees on both sides of the aisle relied increasingly on soft-money funded electioneering tactics as their principal means of candidate support. While the parties continued to spend hard dollars on candidate contributions and coordinated expenditures that were limited by law, most of their electioneering resources were devoted to candidate-specific issue advocacy advertisements and voter mobilization programs conducted jointly by national and state party organizations, both activities that could be financed in large part with soft money. BCRA's ban on soft money prohibited national parties from continuing such activities. Consequently, some analysts predicted that the law would discourage coordination among federal and nonfederal party organizations and thereby reduce the party-building initiatives that had been advanced in recent years (La Raja 2003b , 2003c Milkis 2003) . Others noted that the new law would give parties a stronger incentive to pursue independent expenditures as a principal means of candidate support (Malbin 2004 ). This approach would allow party committees to spend unlimited amounts of hard money on behalf of a candidate, so long as the party did not coordinate its efforts with the candidate. It would thus encourage less interaction between parties and their candidates. Advocates of BCRA countered these arguments with claims that the parties' growing reliance on soft money fundraising and the advent of issue-advocacy advertising had done little to promote party grassroots development (Krasno and Sorauf 2003). They further noted that the national committees could still use hard dollars to assist state and local committees and work with their affiliates to build stronger party organizations.
NATIONAL PARTY ADAPTATION AND RESPONSE
The 2004 election cycle was not the first in which national party committees were forced to respond to changes in campaign finance law. During the past three decades, the parties have had to adjust to changes in the regulatory environment on more than one occasion and have demonstrated a notable capacity to adapt to new rules in both intended and unintended ways.
In the 1970s, national party committees had to adjust to the fundraising and spending restrictions imposed by FECA, which required national party committees to finance their campaign efforts with monies raised in limited amounts from restricted sources. The parties responded by recruiting thousands of individual donors through direct mail and telemarketing programs and embarked on a period of financial growth in which national party committee receipts rose from less than $60 million in 1976 to more than $400 million in 1984.
In the mid-1980s, parties again altered their financial strategies to capitalize on regulatory rulings that permitted the expanded use of soft money, or nonfederal funding. In this ''mixed system'' of hard and soft money fundraising, national party revenues rose from $425 million in 1988 to more than $1 billion in 2002. Soft money fundraising alone jumped from $45 million in 1988 to $496 million in 2002, growing from about 11 percent of total national committee revenues in 1988 to more than 40 percent in 2002.
The parties, however, faced a more formidable challenge in adapting to BCRA. BCRA did increase the individual limit on party contributions, allowing an individual to give up to $25,000 per year to a single national party committee (as opposed to $20,000 under FECA) and up to $57,500 in aggregate contributions to party committees in each two year election cycle (as opposed to an aggregate individual contribution limit under the old law of $50,000 every two years for all federal contributions, including donations to candidates and political action committees called PACs). But the higher limit offered the parties an opportunity to reclaim only a minor portion of former soft money funds. For example, in the 2000 election cycle, the national party committees received a combined $39.3 million of soft money from about 3,900 individual donors who each gave at least $1,000 but less than $60,000. They received $135.6 million of soft money from 429 individual donors who each gave more than $60,000. Even if none of these 429 donors made hard money contributions in 2000 and each of them gave the $57,500 maximum in the 2004 cycle, the parties' maximum total receipts would only be $24.7 million in the 2004 cycle, which would represent a decline of more than $110 million from this small group alone. The parties also raised a total of $280.3 million in soft money contributions from corporations, labor unions, and other organizations, almost all of which would now be prohibited by law (Rogers 2001).
The revenue implications of BCRA were obvious, and both parties began to enhance their hard money fundraising infrastructures and reorient their financial strategies months before the law took effect. The DNC, facing the prospect of a much better funded Republican opposition, began their efforts even before the McCain-Feingold bill was approved by Congress. The DNC used a portion of its 
PARTY FUNDRAISING
Establishing the requisite infrastructure and outreach programs to solicit contributions nationally is only part of a successful party fundraising effort. Individuals also have to be willing to give. At times in the past, the national parties, especially the DNC, had invested resources into hard money fundraising efforts without realizing a major return in response (Corrado 1994). But the 2004 election cycle was defined by a number of factors that led to a political environment that proved especially conducive to party fundraising.
The deep partisan polarization within the electorate offered fertile ground for party fundraising appeals. Even before the election year was underway, the Democrats were unified by the lingering dissatisfaction with the outcome of the controversial 2000 presidential race and the aggressive partisan politics exhibited by the Republicans in the 2002 election cycle. Republicans rallied in support of the President as he led efforts to confront the threat of terrorism and directed the war in Iraq. By the time the voters began going to the polls in Iowa and New Hampshire, public opinion on the President's overall performance was fairly evenly divided, with Democrats and Republicans expressing sharply contrasting views on most of the key issues facing the nation, ranging from the state of the economy to the conduct of the war in Iraq. These partisan attitudes intensified throughout the election cycle, strengthened by the high levels of voter interest in the close presidential race and citizen perceptions of the contest as an important election, with high stakes for the future direction of the nation's foreign and domestic priorities.
The parties also benefited from their investments in improved technology. Both parties used highly sophisticated, computerized direct mail and telemarketing programs to target prospective contributors. These efforts identified likely donors not only by such standard measures as past contribution activity and demographic information, but also by sophisticated ''data mining'' models that culled cultural and lifestyle information that was used to build donor profiles on the basis of such personal information as magazine subscriptions, personal vehicle ownership, and consumer buying habits (Farhi 2004a). More important, the growth of the Internet as a means of conducting a variety of everyday financial transactions made it easy for partisan supporters to contribute to the party of their choice. The DNC and RNC worked to promote this move to online contributions by constructing email lists of millions of party supporters who could be solicited for donations in a highly efficient manner at minimal cost.
This combination of factors constituted a powerful mix, creating a context that one national party leader described as ''a perfect storm'' for party fund- . It produced strong donor incentives, an unprecedented surge in party contributions, and historic levels of individual participation in party funding. As a result, both parties raised record sums of money, and many of the problems anticipated at the time BCRA was adopted failed to emerge. By the end of the 2004 election, the national party committees had raised more money in hard dollars alone than they raised in hard and soft dollars combined in any previous election cycle. In all, the national party committees collected more than $1.2 billion, or about $164 million more than they received in hard and soft money in the 2000 election cycle, and $222 million more than they received in the 2002 cycle. This total included almost $56 million in leftover presidential primary campaign monies transferred to the parties by Bush ($26 million) and Kerry ($29.6 million). Even if these monies are excluded, party fundraising rose by more than $100 million from the 2000 cycle. Both parties were thus able to make up for the loss of soft money with new hard dollar contributions.
As in the past, the Republicans led the Democrats, but by nowhere near the margin that most analysts expected. The Republicans raised $657.1 million compared to $576.2 million by the Democrats. In the 2000 cycle, the Republicans had raised $611.5 million compared to the Democrats' $458.1 million. The Democrats thus narrowed the gap by a substantial amount. In dollar terms, the gap in the amounts reported by the two national parties was the smallest in more than two decades. The last election cycle in which the Democratic national committees were less than $90 million behind their Republican counterparts was in 1978. In that cycle, the Republican national committees took in a mere $59 million, but they still outspent the Democrats, who raised a total of $14 million, by a margin of four-to-one.
It is important to note, however, that a strict comparison of the finances of the national party committees in the 2004 election cycle with receipts in previous cycles is complicated by changes in party structure that took place in response to BCRA. Prior to the 2004 cycle, the RNC included certain nonfederal party organizations, such as the Republican Governors Association and Republican state leadership organizations within their Republican National State Elections Committee (RNSEC), the party's principal nonfederal (soft money) operation. The Republican Governors Association conference was also included in the RNC's soft money accounts. In advance of the 2004 election, the Republican Governors Association was reorganized as a Section 527 organization independent of the RNC, so that its finances would not be affected by the soft money ban imposed on the national committee. (The Democratic Governors Association had operated as an independent Section 527 organization for a number of years prior to 2004 for political reasons unrelated to BCRA.) Similarly, the Republican State Leadership Committee operated as a Section 527 organization independent of any national party committee. In the 2004 cycle, the Republican Governors Association raised and spent $34 million, according to reports filed with the IRS covering all of 2003 and 2004. (The Democratic Governors Association reported $24 million in receipts and expenditures.) The Republican State Leadership Committee raised and spent $10.7 million. Since the finances of these committees were reported by the RNC as part of the aggregate amount received in the RNSEC account, separate disclosure reports detailing the finances of these particular entities were not filed with the FEC in past years. Consequently, the finances of these committees in past cycles, which are included in the Republican soft money totals for past cycles, are not readily available. If the funds raised by these committees in 2004 are considered in calculations of national committee funding, the gap between the two parties is wider than that suggested by the totals reported by the national party committees but still smaller than in any previous election cycle in at least a decade.
Democratic national party committees increased their total hard money receipts by almost $365 million compared to the 2000 cycle, while the Republican committees increased their hard money by $295 million. Moreover, for the first time since the beginning of the modern campaign finance era in 1974, the DNC led the RNC in fundraising. The Democrats' principal national committee raised $394.4 million in the 2004 cycle, or about $2 million more than the RNC. This achievement was especially noteworthy, given the committee's failure to keep pace with RNC hard money fundraising in the past. In the 2000 cycle, for example, the RNC raised about $89 million more than the DNC in hard money donations to go with a $30 million advantage in soft money gifts. In the 2002 cycle, the RNC surpassed the DNC by more than $100 million in hard dollars alone. But in 2004, the combination of strong anti-Bush sentiments among the Democratic faithful and a renewed emphasis on small dollar donors helped the DNC more than triple its hard money fundraising total as compared to the 2000 cycle, which was the committee's best previous hard money fundraising cycle ever. After Source: Federal Election Commission data. Totals are adjusted for transfers among committees, particularly in soft money accounts, and thus may vary slightly from the sums reported individually by committees.
a The 2004 Democratic totals include $29.6 million in excess primary funds transferred from the Kerry for President Committee ($23.6 million to the DNC, $3 million to the DSCC, and $3 million to the DCCC). The Republican totals include $26 million in excess primary funds transferred from the Bush-Cheney '04 presidential committee ($24 million to the RNC, $1 million to the NRSC, and$1 million to the NRCC). This sharp rise in the number of new contributors early in the cycle proved to be a harbinger of things to come. As public opinion on the war in Iraq became more divided, and the presidential election began to take shape with the emergence of John Kerry as the Democratic challenger, party support continued to expand, as hundreds of thousands of individuals expressed their political views by contributing to their party's cause. In the first four months of 2004, the DNC posted 35 million pieces of fundraising mail, which exceeded the amount of fundraising mail posted by the committee in the entire decade of the 1990s (Democratic National Committee 2004d). By the end of the election in November, the DNC had completely revitalized its once relatively moribund direct mail program. Starting with 400,000 direct mail donors after the 2000 election, the DNC added 2.3 million more, bringing its total direct mail donor base to 2. While much of the growth in party receipts was a result of the increase in small donor fundraising, the national party committees did collect substantial amounts from their large donor solicitation programs, which made an important contribution to the national parties' overall financial success. According to a postelection analysis of party contributions conducted by the FEC, the RNC and DNC raised a total of $104. . Since BCRA increased the annual limit on individual gifts to a national party committee by $5,000, these 4,168 maximum donations translate into $20.8 million in additional hard dollar receipts that can be attributed to the change in the contribution limit.
PARTY EXPENDITURES
Armed with ample coffers, the national party committees were able to spend substantial sums of money in support of their candidates. Generally, the parties fol- lowed the basic strategic approach employed in other recent election cycles: they concentrated their expenditures in battleground presidential election states and a relatively small number of Senate and House races, while allocating only minor sums to party activities in states that were not venues for targeted federal contests. The DNC and RNC also followed past patterns in concentrating their expenditures on the presidential race, leaving spending in the congressional races to the Hill committees. Beyond these general approaches, party spending varied significantly from the patterns established in the past. While some of these changes were related to BCRA, most of the differences were due to the particular dynamics of the 2004 presidential race, as well as major innovations in the way parties participate in presidential elections. One of these innovations, the use of independent expenditures, was an anticipated change. The other, which can be called ''hybrid spending,'' was not.
After the passage of the 1974 FECA and the implementation of the presidential public funding system, direct candidate support in presidential general election campaigns was financed principally through the public funding grant received by each of the major party nominees, along with a limited amount of party coordinated spending financed with hard money funds. FECA rules specifically prohibited party committees from making independent expenditures that directly advocated the election or defeat of a presidential candidate. Yet, parties did find ways of supplementing their limited coordinated spending, primarily by supporting candidates through indirect means of support, such as expenditures on generic party activities, including voter registration and mobilization programs, most of which could be funded with soft dollars. In the 1996 election, the parties also began to use a mix of hard and soft money to finance issue advocacy advertisements in direct support of their presidential nominees. This tactic quickly became the preferred alternative of both party committees, since monies spent on issue ads were not subject to spending restrictions. In both 1996 and 2000 the parties spent more on issue advocacy advertisements than they spent on coordinated communications.
BCRA ended the soft money expenditures of national party committees but made no change in the limits on party coordinated expenditures. Thus, in 2004, the DNC and RNC were permitted to spend $16.2 million apiece in coordination with their presidential nominees. BCRA did, however, expand the parties' capacity to spend money in direct support of a federal candidate by codifying rules that recognize the national party committees' ability to make independent expenditures on behalf of candidates. Under BCRA's original provisions, a party committee was required to choose at the time of a candidate's nomination whether it would assist that candidate through limited coordinated expenditures or unlimited independent expenditures. But the Supreme Court struck down this provision the party abided by the coordination rules to ensure that the independent expenditures were ''independent.'' The new regulations also dropped the pre-BCRA regulatory provision that prohibited independent expenditures in presidential general election contests (see 69 Fed. Reg. 63919).
The parties made the most of the new regulatory environment, spending money both in coordination with and independent of the presidential candidates. The parties also waited until the general election to begin this spending. Although the DNC and RNC did spend money throughout the election year on generic activities such as voter registration, volunteer organization, and voter mobilization, they made no coordinated or independent expenditures until after the national conventions. In 1996 and 2000, the parties had begun spending funds much earlier, launching issue advocacy advertising campaigns in support of their prospective nominees by early summer. But these efforts, particularly the RNC's advertising in 1996 in support of Robert Dole and the DNC's advertising in 2000 in support of Al Gore, were designed to help candidates constrained by the public funding expenditure limit to weather the ''bridge period'' between the effective end of the primaries (the point at which a putative nominee has clearly emerged) and the start of the formal general election period. In 2004, such party assistance was not needed, since Bush and Kerry had opted out of the primary matching funds program and were raising unprecedented sums of money in the months leading up to the party conventions. During the preconvention period, Kerry also benefited from tens of millions of dollars of spending by Democratic-oriented 527 groups, which minimized the need for party assistance. Consequently, the national committees could conserve their monies for use in the final election.
The DNC and RNC spent more money on direct candidate support in the 2004 presidential race than in any previous presidential contest. In addition to the $16 million in coordinated expenditures made by each party, the committees carried out major advertising campaigns financed through independent expenditures. Overall, the two national committees spent a combined $138.7 million on independent expenditures, all focused on the presidential race. Most of this sum, more than $120 million, was spent by the DNC. From the time of Kerry's nomination at the end of the July, the DNC maintained a relatively steady stream of independent advertising, primarily consisting of negative advertising against President Bush. The committee averaged about $9 million in spending per week, beginning in the first week of August and spent more than twice the amount the Kerry campaign spent on paid media during the course of the general election.
DNC spending was especially important in August, when the Bush campaign held a major financial advantage over Kerry. During this month, the Kerry campaign, due to its end of July convention, was already operating off of the $75 million presidential public funding grant, while the Bush campaign was still free to spend unlimited amounts during the weeks before the Republican convention at the end of August. The DNC was therefore responsible for carrying the Democratic message in August and spent $35 million on paid media doing so. In comparison, the Bush campaign spent about $33 million on paid media during this month, while the Kerry campaign spent a mere $406,000. The DNC, however, chose to broadcast negative advertisements against President Bush throughout August, rather than ads directly promoting Kerry or responding to the charges contained in the ads sponsored by the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth (SBVT), which attacked Kerry's record of service in Vietnam. The SBVT ads were initially broadcast in only seven markets, with fewer than 100 spots aired each day, as part of a relatively modest $500,000 media buy (Neilsen Monitor-Plus and The University of Wisconsin Advertising Project 2004; Edsall 2004e). But the attacks received widespread media coverage, multiplying their exposure, and thus had a greater effect on the public discourse in the campaign than the DNC media, which failed to effectively address the issues raised by the group.
The RNC devoted $18.3 million to independent expenditures in support of President Bush in the period after the Republican convention. Thus it spent substantially less in this way than the Democrats. The primary reason for the disparity is that the Republicans pursued an innovative tactic, unforeseen by either the Kerry campaign or analysts of the new law. This new form of financing consisted of campaign advertisements jointly funded by the presidential campaign and the RNC in an ''allocated'' or ''hybrid'' manner. The initial advertisements financed in this way, which were broadcast in September, featured President Bush and included generic party messages about the party's agenda or principles, as well as mention of the Republican ''leaders in Congress'' (Sidoti 2004a). The Republicans contended that such ads, which combined a message of support for the President with a generic party message, could be financed in an allocated manner with the cost divided between the presidential campaign and the party committee. Further, they reasoned that such allocated generic party spending did not count against the party's coordinated spending limit or constitute a contribution to the publicly funded presidential nominee. At the time these ads were initiated, neither the party nor the presidential campaign committee submitted an advisory opinion request to the FEC seeking guidance as to whether this practice was permissible under federal law.
The Republicans chose the hybrid spending approach over the independent expenditure approach because it allowed the presidential campaign to exercise more control over the content of party advertising, since the party did not have to act independently of the presidential campaign. It was also a highly creative way of reducing the severity of the spending caps imposed on both publicly funded candidates and party coordinated expenses. In effect, the tactic allowed the presidential campaign to stretch its limited public money and spend far more than the amount allowed under the public funding expenditure limit. From the party's perspective, it allowed the RNC to spend far more in coordination with a candidate than the amount allowed under the coordinated spending limit.
Not to be outdone, the DNC and the Kerry campaign soon followed suit and developed jointly financed hybrid advertisements of their own. Contrary to most preelection expectations, the financial role of the national parties did not diminish in 2004. In fact, the DNC and RNC spent record sums on direct candidate support in the presidential race. Moreover, in the presidential general election, the party committees actually outspent the candidates. In all, the DNC spent $160 million in support of Kerry, or twice the amount given to the Kerry campaign in public funding. The RNC spent $80 million in direct support of Bush, an amount slightly greater than the sum Bush received in public funding. In contrast, in 2000 the national parties spent $13.7 million apiece in coordinated funds in support of the presidential nominees. In addition, the parties spent at least $59 million on issue advocacy advertising funded largely with soft money (Corrado 2002). The 2000 total, about $86 million, was less than 40 percent of the $240 million total spent by the national committees in 2004.
Beyond this direct candidate support, both parties also mounted extensive, highly sophisticated, volunteer-intensive voter outreach and mobilization efforts. These efforts were particularly noteworthy, not only because they constituted an important component of party activity in 2004, but also because it was this aspect of party operations that some observers thought would be the most likely to suffer the loss of soft money under BCRA. In recent elections, the parties financed their voter outreach efforts primarily with soft money. Thus, it was anticipated that this aspect of party electioneering might be reduced significantly under The parties' willingness to invest resources in these voter turnout programs was based on the experience of the 2000 presidential election, which highlighted The party also decided to focus their efforts on turning out their partisan base and concentrating on prospective Republican supporters, or ''soft'' voters, who were not currently registered or had not voted in the previous presidential race, instead of focusing most of their resources on undecided voters. This strategic decision was based on the assumption, supported by opinion research, that more than 90 percent of likely voters or registered partisans had already made their decision as to whether or not they would support President Bush for reelection. It was grounded on party research that highlighted the inefficiency of an approach relying on traditional phone banks and direct mail programs to turn out voters in traditionally Republican precincts. This research indicated that only 15 percent of all Republican voters-and an even smaller share of softRepublican voters-lived in precincts that voted Republican by 65 percent or more (Edsall and Grimaldi 2004). The RNC thus relied on sophisticated microtargeting programs based on commercial databases and survey research to identify prospective supporters outside of these traditional Republican strongholds, including those living in primarily Democratic neighborhoods. These efforts produced a broad base of potential contacts. According to Bush campaign strategist Matthew Dowd, this targeting quadrupled the number of Republican voters who could be reached through direct mail, phone banks, and knocking on doors (Edsall and Grimaldi 2004). The party developed an extensive person-to-person, colleagueto-colleague, largely volunteer voter contact program to reach these new voters, spending a total of $125 million on this effort, or three times the amount allocated for voter contact in the 2000 campaign (Balz and Edsall 2004).
The Democrats also increased their investments in voter contact and mobilization, even as pro-Democratic 527 groups such as America Coming Together, Voices for Working Families, and the New Democratic Network were spending tens of millions of dollars to conduct voter registration and outreach programs that were designed to increase Democratic turnout. Like the RNC, the DNC emphasized person-to-person contact methods and identified prospective supporters with computerized targeting programs. But unlike the RNC, the Demo-crats tended to focus on city precincts and other Democratic strongholds, while the pro-Democratic 527 groups placed more effort on rural areas and suburban precincts. In all, the DNC invested $80 million into its field operation, an increase of 166 percent over the amount spent on such operations in 2000 (Democratic National Committee 2004b). The party organized 233,000 volunteers to form the backbone of its efforts and made eleven million person-to-person, door-to-door contacts with voters, as well as thirty-eight million telephone calls to prospective supporters in battleground states (Democratic National Committee 2004b).
Thus, the parties sponsored a substantial amount of activity in the 2004 election. The DNC and RNC each spent a total of more than $200 million in connection with the presidential race, with the DNC spending more on advertising ($160 million) than field operations ($80 million), and the RNC emphasizing field operations ($125 million) over advertising ($80 million). While the parties engaged in more activity independent of candidates than in the past, there was still a substantial amount of coordinated activity. Most important, the parties made major gains in their organizational development, at least in targeted areas of the nation, and developed viable programs for promoting grassroots participation.
LOOKING AHEAD
National party financing in the first election conducted under BCRA proved to be more dynamic and vigorous than most observers anticipated. Will these committees continue to thrive in the future? Although major challenges remain, the prospects for future party success are very encouraging, and the parties are likely to continue to play a prominent role in federal electioneering for some time to come.
In the 2006 election cycle, the parties will again face the problem of raising the monies needed to wage meaningful campaigns without access to soft money. They will face the additional burden of having to raise funds without the public excitement and partisan intensity that accompanies a presidential campaign. It is therefore likely that national committee receipts will decline, as is typical in a midterm election cycle. But the parties are now in a better position to maintain their financial support than they were four years ago and should continue to operate for some time in a political environment conducive to party fundraising.
The national committees will begin the next election cycle with the largest donor bases ever recruited in party history. The central challenge they will face is finding ways to retain these donors and keep them actively involved in party funding. If the general experience of most organizations with direct mail contributors is taken as a basis for judging party prospects, it is likely that these committees will experience some attrition in donor support. The party organizations' success in minimizing the rate of attrition will be a key to their continuing financial success. This task will be complicated by the competition for dollars created by the leading 527 committees-should they follow through on their stated intentions of continuing their efforts in future elections-since these groups will be making appeals to many of those who gave to the parties in 2004. The parties thus will need to be responsive to donors and put forward clear messages that provide individuals with strong incentives to continue to invest in party politics, rather than the initiatives of more specialized organized groups.
Party prospects should also be buoyed by a political environment characterized by polarized partisan attitudes. A second narrowly decided presidential race did little to resolve the partisan divide within the electorate. Nor did it resolve the divisions of opinion on such key issues as the war in Iraq, tax cuts, health care, and budget priorities. With a debate over Social Security reform and the prospect of at least one Supreme Court nomination looming in the next Congress, the parties should have an issue agenda favorable to partisan appeals.
Finally, the Internet and other technologies will continue to offer parties a means of soliciting contributions at minimal cost. Both parties have developed email lists containing contact information for millions of individuals, which will provide them with opportunities to solicit contributions through narrowly targeted and personalized messages. Party websites will receive even greater use as portals for collecting contributions. Individuals interested in supporting a party will find it easy to do so by making a donation with only a few clicks of a mouse.
In 2004, the national party organizations once again demonstrated their capacity for adapting to changes in the regulatory and political environment. At the end of the first election under BCRA, the national party organizations were stronger, not weaker.
NOTES

